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WHO WATCHES THE WATCHMEN? HOW PROSECUTORS 
FAIL TO PROTECT CITIZENS FROM POLICE VIOLENCE 
 
Joshua Hegarty 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 Prosecutors are arguably the most powerful agents of the criminal justice 
system. It is not an uncommon sentiment expressed within the legal community, 
whether for law students, practicing attorneys, and former prosecutors, that it is a 
position for attorneys who play to win. Prosecutors often do win, but in large part, 
it is because their discretion allows them to set the rules. 
  While judges typically are afforded discretion in sentencing, their hands 
can be, and often are, bound by mandatory sentencing legislation. Police officers 
have similarly been granted broad discretion under 4
th
 Amendment jurisprudence, 
however, this discretion can be tempered by prosecutors, with their choices on 
who to charge, for what crimes, and in the event of trial, what evidence to present. 
Prosecutors gain their power from their broad discretion, specifically with respect 
to who to charge with crimes. While prosecutorial discretion is a useful and very 
important tool, it is so broad as to open the door for prosecutors to act against the 
public good, whether through biased, discriminatory, or political exercise of their 
discretion. Legal attacks levied against prosecutors on the basis of discriminatory 
prosecution have largely resulted in further shielding of prosecutors and creating 
incredibly high standards of proof to show misconduct. 
 The likelihood of political decisions is especially apparent when citizens 
accuse police officers of crimes and when citizens are killed by police officers, or 
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otherwise wind up dead in police custody. In nearly all jurisdictions in the United 
States, chief prosecutors are elected officials.
 1
 As such, all of their prosecutorial 
decisions, along with the general policies imposed upon the prosecutors working 
beneath them, have some basis in politicizing, as there are certainly instances 
where the pubic good may be different than what the public perceives to be good. 
When police officers are accused of crimes, this problem is exasperated. 
Prosecutors rely upon the cooperation of police departments to do their job and 
the voting public tends to respect and believe the police. Short of overwhelmingly 
clear evidence of unwarranted violence by a police officer, even charging a police 
officer with a crime may have tremendous political backlash for a prosecutor. 
 In the past, events of police violence were more easily brushed off as 
intermittent, rather than epidemic. But because of new media and new technology, 
it is clear that citizens are killed by police officers at alarming rates across the 
country despite the fact that on the job police deaths appear to be on the decline. 
Even more alarming is the lack of indictments against those police officers, even 
in circumstances when unarmed people are handled with lethal force. Even when 
officers are indicted, they are rarely convicted, and when convicted, significantly 
less likely than the general population to spend time incarcerated. 
 Whatever the reason for this failure to indict, it sends a message to our 
police officers in that their power is not being restricted and that they are allowed 
to use lethal force when non-lethal force, or even no force at all, might suffice. 
                                                          
1
 This is not the case for Federal Prosecutors, as they are appointed by the President and confirmed 
by the Senate. Amongst the states, only Alaska, Connecticut, and New Jersey select their chief 
prosecutors through gubernational appointment. In all other states, the chief prosecutor, whether 
known as the “District Attorney,” “County Attorney,” or some other title, is elected by popular 
ballot. 
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America’s prosecutors are clearly not even attempting to hold police officers 
accountable for lives of the people that they kill and do not even appear to pretend 
that they are doing so. Because of this, we need to implement a system by which 
independent offices, not dependent upon police cooperation, and not subject to 
replacement by public opinion, would be tasked with investigating and 
prosecuting police officers accused of crimes. 
II. THE VALUE OF PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION 
 Discretion is the chief tool prosecutors use in exercising their duty to seek 
justice as it allows prosecutors to act with the special insight granted by their 
position. In fact, despite the windows it opens for abuse of the justice system, 
prosecutorial discretion is necessary for the criminal justice system to function at 
all, for several reasons. First, while sentencing guidelines and criminal statutes do 
not always allow for circumstances to mitigate a perpetrator’s sentence when 
appropriate, a prosecutor can always elect to forgo charges.
2
 This allows, although 
does not require, the justice system to treat defendants as individuals in ways that 
are not always otherwise available. Some would argue that prosecutors can, and 
should, be among the chief agents in reforming the criminal justice system, 
specifically because of the powers afforded by discretion.
3
 The possibility of 
over-criminalization, that is lawmakers crafting criminal statutes that either 
criminalize behavior that does not harm society, or otherwise using terms that 
create overly broad prohibitions, requires an intermediary to prevent the waste of 
                                                          
2
 Prosecutorial Misconduct § 4:3 (2d ed.) 
3 See generally  K. Babe Howell, Prosecutorial Discretion and the Duty to Seek Justice in an 
Overburdened Criminal Justice System, 27 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 285 (2014). 
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public resources in enforcing bad laws.
4
 Prosecutorial discretion is the only 
available tool in our criminal justice system that can serve this role. But 
ultimately, even if these reasons failed to justify prosecutorial discretion, it would 
still be a necessary tool purely on the basis of the sheer volume of crimes that are 
committed weighed against the actual, and limited, amount of resources that can 
be devoted to law enforcement.
5
 Governments have limited budgets, and finite 
numbers of prosecutors and judges. To remove prosecutorial discretion 
completely would have to require that all people arrested or suspected of crimes 
must be charged, regardless of factors such as the social harms resulting from the 
alleged offense or the amount and nature of evidence that could support a 
conviction. Without an agent of government deciding which investigations are 
worth carrying out, which charges to consider, and what parties to haul into court, 
the criminal justice system would grind to a halt. Abolishing prosecutorial 
discretion, therefore, would be entirely unworkable. 
III. THE COSTS OF DISCRETION6 
 While discretion does have clear benefits for the justice system, it has very 
real costs as well. A primary concern is that prosecutors use their discretion is 
racially discriminatory ways, and even a cursory glance at the differences in 
prison populations between people of color and white people justifies this 
                                                          
4
 Prosecutorial Misconduct § 4:3 (2d ed.) 
5
 Prosecutorial Misconduct § 4:3 (2d ed.) 
6
 A major area of debate in relation to prosecutorial discretion is the use of plea bargaining as it 
pertains to issues of procedural fairness and the likelihood of innocent people pleading guilty in 
order to avoid being found guilty through a potentially unfair trial. There is a considerable body of 
scholarship on the topic. Plea bargaining, however, will be largely ignored here, as this Article is 
concerned chiefly with charging discretion. When no one is charged, plea bargaining does not 
become a relevant issue. 
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concern.
7
 Even more concerning is how willing the Supreme Court has been in 
protecting prosecutors from claims of discriminatory prosecution, in the process 
protecting even further the ability of prosecutors to avoid being scrutinized for 
discretionary charges that are not related to a protected status of the charged party. 
 In McCleskey v. Kemp, the Supreme Court ruled that the results of the 
Baldus Study could not support a finding that any specific defendant was 
discriminated against in sentencing.
8
 The study showed a high correlation existed 
within the state of Georgia between the races of criminal defendants and their 
victims, and the likelihood of a defendant being convicted and sentenced to death. 
The findings suggested that racial discrimination in prosecution and sentencing 
had led to a disproportionate amount of black defendants being sentenced to 
death, and even more so when accused of killing white people. This decision is 
most notably remembered as establishing that racial discrimination within the 
justice system must be established by very specific evidence, and that is why it 
can be found in Criminal Law and Constitutional Law textbooks. However, it also 
stands for the, potentially equally important, proposition that judicial and 
prosecutorial discretion are “firmly entrenched in American law,” and, as such, 
“are final and unreviewable.”9 There is simply no room within the justice system 
for any party to review the decisions of a prosecutor to charge anyone with a 
                                                          
7
 It demands noting that while this Article is focused on police misconduct and violence, it is not 
written as an attempt to explore deeper racial biases in the American justice system, and as such is 
written in what amounts to racially neutral language. This is not, by any means, an attempt to 
ignore that police violence and other misconduct is suffered in disproportionate amounts by people 
of color. The issue of reducing police violence is, to this author’s mind, one of the very few 
racialized problems in the justice system that may be solvable through racially neutral solutions. 
For a very full examination of systematic racism and biases in the criminal justice system, see 
Michelle Alexander’s The New Jim Crow. 
8
 481 U.S. 279, (1987) 
9
 McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 311-12, (1987) 
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crime unless that review is based upon claims of unlawful discrimination. The 
corollary goes unsaid: there is nothing that can be done when a prosecutor fails to 
bring charges despite the arguable existence of probable cause. This is the 
problem inherent with the ways that prosecutors treat police officers; there just is 
no recourse to seek justice for the families of those killed by police officers, 
except for trying to convince a prosecutor to change his mind. While political 
pressure, in theory, could lead to such a change in opinion, it is not as if elections 
happen on demand. The more likely result of political pressure to bring charges is 
that grand jury will be called. This poses a very specific problem that will be 
explained in greater detail below. 
 In 1996, the Supreme Court elected to further shield prosecutorial 
discretion in United States v. Armstrong, where it held that discovery that could 
show discrimination in charging can only be obtained by, essentially, proving the 
very discrimination that the discovery would show.
10
 The prosecutor in 
Armstrong was accused of racially discriminating in charging decisions, and, so, 
the defendant attempted to gain discovery to show that the prosecutor could have 
charged similarly situated people of different races, but elected not to do so. 
While such a standard to prevail appears reasonable and well in line with 
McCleskey, the problem is that the McCleskey standard has become the same one 
to be applied for discovery of the very documents that most likely satisfy the 
burden of proof. That is, in order to obtain discovery of documents to help plead a 
case of racial discrimination in prosecution, very specific evidence of actual racial 
discrimination in the very prosecution being targeted must be provided. This 
                                                          
10
 517 U.S. 456, (1996) 
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decision effectively allows prosecutors to discriminate in charging because of the 
nigh impossibility of proving such discrimination. But, it also serves to heighten 
the protections afforded to the decisions of prosecutors. Because discovery is so 
heavily guarded, and because there are no classes afforded special protection 
against discrimination related to whether or not a person is a police officer, there 
is nothing to prevent a prosecutor from simply deciding to never charge police 
officers with crimes.  
 These decisions support the notion that prosecutors have essentially 
unfettered discretion. Their decisions are shielded from review and can be made 
for any reason, so long as they cannot be shown to be discrimination based upon a 
legally protected status of a charged defendant. While raising obvious issues 
about racial discrimination in prosecution, these protections also allow for other 
arbitrary, personal, professional, or political reasons to factor into the decisions of 
prosecutors. With no oversight, and no requirements to charge any particular 
individuals, prosecutors have been allowed to do as they please, without penalty, 
except under egregious circumstances. 
 When charges are shown to have am illegal and discriminatory basis, they 
can be thrown out.
11
 While showing such discrimination proves to be a 
considerable burden, the remedy of having charges dropped reflects a clear legal 
policy: it is a recognition that unlawful discrimination is so harmful that the 
justice system would rather dismiss charges when probable cause might exist, 
then to allow discrimination to affect charging decisions.  
                                                          
11
 Ellen S. Podgor, The Ethics and Professionalism of Prosecutors in Discretionary Decisions, 68 
Fordham L. Rev. 1511, 1518 (2000) 
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 Ethical guidelines do, sometimes, exist, which mean to control the ways in 
which prosecutors exercise their discretion. However, many, such as those 
provided by the Department of Justice, and are expected to apply to federal 
prosecutors, are exactly that, guidelines. They are not enforceable by law.
 12
 
 The issues commonly raised in discussions about prosecutorial discretion 
tend to focus on discrimination related to defendants who have been charged with 
a crime. What is not often discussed is the issue of a failure to bring charges. Only 
legislative action could correct this. Of course, for the reasons explained above, 
prosecutors could not be required to charge all persons for whom probable cause 
existed.
13
 The result would simply exhaust government resources, or else be 
ignored by prosecutors as overzealous legislation. To be enforceable, rules 
regulating mandatory prosecution would have to differ from the ethical guidelines 
that currently exist, and in so doing create either a private right of action or else a 
mandatory review of decisions not charge from an independent source. Either 
type of enforcement would be unworkable. A private right of action would either 
grant unlimited standing, such that any person could petition the government to 
bring charges against any person, or else it would have to limit standing in ways 
that would be inherently arbitrary, that would, at times, grant no person standing. 
Independent review would be an administrative quagmire, as it would necessarily 
require prosecutors to conduct investigation into all potential crimes, and then to 
present their findings before independent review boards. It is certainly a 
miscarriage of justice for a person to escape criminal charges solely because the 
                                                          
12
 Ellen S. Podgor, The Ethics and Professionalism of Prosecutors in Discretionary Decisions, 68 
Fordham L. Rev. 1511, 1512  (2000) 
13
 Prosecutorial Misconduct § 4:3 (2d ed.) 
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relevant prosecutor’s office declines to charge that person. Yet, the very nature, 
and necessity, of discretion precludes the possibility of mandatory charging.  
IV. THE SPECIAL PROBLEM OF GRAND JURIES14 
 Grand juries pose a particularly interesting, and political, role for 
prosecutors. While the 5th Amendment requires the use of grand juries in the 
process of prosecution for federal crimes, in State jurisdictions, procedures can 
vary. In most jurisdictions, prosecutors have the option of either bringing a case 
before a grand jury or before a judge in a preliminary hearing.
15
 The purpose of 
either is the same, to determine if probable cause exists to support charges against 
an accused person. In the 2009-2010 year, federal prosecutors attempted to 
prosecute more than 150,000 defendants, and in only 11 of these cases did a grand 
jury fail to indict the accused.
16
 This is not a coincidence. In a very real sense, a 
grand jury’s job is to indict, and return a “true bill,” which a prosecutor uses to 
move forward with charging. Prosecutors have discretion in deciding what cases 
to present before a grand jury, and will typically decline to do so unless they 
expect an indictment.  
 While a prosecutor is not necessarily bound by the decision of a grand 
jury, and can elect to not charge a person who has been indicted, or can attempt to 
prove probable cause in a hearing after a grand jury does not indict, the grand jury 
                                                          
14
 While grand juries predate the Revolutionary War, and are mentioned in the 5
th
 Amendment, 
they are still a misunderstood process, often omitted from representations of the justice system in 
popular media. While they do vary amongst jurisdictions, the process typically involves a 
prosecutor presenting evidence and witnesses before a group of citizens who are then tasked with 
answering the question of whether or not a crime may have been committed and whether or not 
the accused may have committed the crime in question. A unanimous decision is not required and 
the standard is far below the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard applied in criminal trials. 
15
 How Does a Grand Jury Work?, FindLaw, http://criminal.findlaw.com/criminal-procedure/how-
does-a-grand-jury-work.html 
16
 Department of Justice Statistics, http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fjs10st.pdf  
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process, in effect, takes the charging decision away from the prosecutor.
17
 This 
process allows a prosecutor to take advantage of the likely outcomes of a grand 
jury in order to bring charges or fail to bring charges in a way that can appear 
blameless to the public. Because information regarding indictment rates with 
grand juries is fairly ascertainable, prosecutors can essentially use the grand jury 
process to exercise their charging discretion in a way that serves to insulate them 
politically. The process allows prosecutors to not look foolish in bringing charges 
after a grand jury votes to indict on what might be flimsy evidence, while also 
allowing a prosecutor to look competent and faultless when what might be 
substantial evidence fails to sway a grand jury. 
 The grand jury process has been criticized by some as unnecessary and 
outdated, especially given the fact that they are no longer used in England. Some 
would also consider it an infringement upon the rights of the accused, as 
proceedings are conducted in secret, and the accused has right to confront 
witnesses or otherwise inform the jurors of exculpatory evidence.
18
 In many 
proceedings, the only representatives of the justice system present are prosecutors. 
There is no judge, and so, instructions of law are given by the very prosecutors 
asking for an indictment.
19
 Jurors are allowed to consider evidence that would not 
be admissible at trial, including hearsay, illegally obtained evidence, or even the 
                                                          
17
 How Does a Grand Jury Work?, FindLaw, http://criminal.findlaw.com/criminal-procedure/how-
does-a-grand-jury-work.html 
18
 Gregory D. Morril, Prosecutorial Investigations Using Grand Jury Reports: Due Process and 
Political Accountability Concerns, 44 Colum. J.L. & Soc. Probs. 483, 485 (2011) 
19
 Andrew D. Leipold, Why Grand Juries Do Not (and Cannot) Protect the Accused, 80 Cornell L. 
Rev. 260, 266 (1995) 
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personal opinion of the prosecutor.
20
 In addition to these potential problems for 
the accused, some would argue that these same problems render grand jurors 
amongst the least qualified to make decisions to indict.
21
 Such critics have noted 
that the only ways to correct these issues in a grand jury process would be to 
make the process more similar to a jury trial, with cross-examination, a 
requirement to bring forth exculpatory evidence, and only allowing the 
consideration of admissible evidence.
22
 Rather than make such changes, which 
would drastically alter the process itself, some would suggest that the process be 
done away with entirely. While this Article is not concerned with the question of 
whether grand juries should be abandoned under American law, it will be 
addressed below how the many criticisms of the process suggesting that it unfairly 
favors indictment can show opposite results when a prosecutor appears to not 
desire indictment. It may just as easily serve as a “rubber stamp” as it can a “get 
out of jail free card” for both the police and the prosecutor. 
 
 
V. POLICE VIOLENCE 
 Police violence is occurring at epidemic levels and has been since at least 
1976. In 1976, the FBI began tracking the number of times in which a police 
officer shot and killed someone in the line of duty. Since then, its data suggests 
                                                          
20
 Andrew D. Leipold, Why Grand Juries Do Not (and Cannot) Protect the Accused, 80 Cornell L. 
Rev. 260, 267 (1995) 
21
 Andrew D. Leipold, Why Grand Juries Do Not (and Cannot) Protect the Accused, 80 Cornell L. 
Rev. 260 (1995) 
22
 Andrew D. Leipold, Why Grand Juries Do Not (and Cannot) Protect the Accused, 80 Cornell L. 
Rev. 260 (1995) 
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that there has not been a single year with fewer than 300 lethal police shootings. 
The highest number the FBI has recorded was 460 fatal police shootings per year. 
However, federal officials have admitted this data is largely dependent on the 
self-reporting of local police departments, and is consequently, almost certainly 
lower than the actual number of lethal police shootings.
23
 This data, being limited 
to lethal police shootings, obviously ignores non-lethal instances of police 
violence, data about people who die while in police custody, and instances of 
sexual violence by police officers. Because the FBI data’s self-reporting makes 
the data unable to accurately document the instances of police related killings, the 
Washington Post has elected to undertake its own accounting of lethal police 
shootings.
24
 This data is compiled through tracking localized news reports, 
reviewing information compiled by other independent databases and through 
additional investigatory reporting.
25
 This data is similarly limited to the specific 
issue of citizens who are shot to death by police in the line of duty. It does not 
include instances in which people die in other ways during an encounter with 
police, or within police custody. Nor does it include other causes of death, or even 
instances of non-lethal violence. It does, however, allow for viewing the data 
according to demographics, such as race, age, gender, mental illness, threat level, 
and the presence of a weapon. 
                                                          
23
 Wesley Lowery, There have been 500 people shot and killed by police in the U.S. so far in 2015 
(Jul. 10, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2015/07/10/there-have-
been-500-people-shot-and-killed-by-police-in-the-u-s-so-far-in-2015/. 
24
 http://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/national/police-shootings/ 
25
How The Washington Post is examining police shootings in the U.S., (June 30, 2015), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/how-the-washington-post-is-examining-police-
shootings-in-the-us/2015/06/29/f42c10b2-151b-11e5-9518-f9e0a8959f32_story.html 
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  According to this data, in 2015, 987 people have been shot to death by 
police officers in the United States, across every state except for Rhode Island.
26
 
The Washington Post has continued to compile this data into 2016, and as of 
January 15, 2016, there have been 24 people shot and killed by police.
27
 
 What could be responsible for this rash of killings? Popular opinion would 
suggest that the job of a police officer must be increasingly dangerous. Wisconsin 
Governor Scott Walker, in an attempt to discredit Barack Obama during his run 
for presidency, suggested exactly this: that the number of police officers killed in 
the line of duty has increased during Obama’s presidency.28 However, the 
opposite has proven true. Police fatalities have been decreasing since Ronald 
Reagan’s presidency. Statistics have been compiled with respect to the number of 
police fatalities during first seven years of every two term president since, and 
including, Reagan. During Reagan’s presidency, there were 576, 528 for Clinton, 
and 405 for Bush. As of September 3, 2015, only 314 police officers had died in 
the line of duty during Obama’s presidency.29  
As of November 15, 2015, only 110 police officers had died in the line of duty. 
Of these, only 35 were gun related, down 19% since 2014, while 47 were due to 
traffic accidents.
30
 By the end of 2015, the total amount of police officer fatalities 
                                                          
26
 Of these shootings, 38 of the killed were both unarmed and black. Fewer than half of the killed 
were white. 
27
 http://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/national/police-shootings/ 
28
 Jud Lounsbury, Police Fatalities Much Lower Than Under Reagan, Yet Walker Blames Obama, 
(Sep. 3, 2015), http://www.progressive.org/news/2015/09/188286/police-fatalities-much-lower-
under-reagan-yet-walker-blames-obama 
29
 Jud Lounsbury, Police Fatalities Much Lower Than Under Reagan, Yet Walker Blames Obama, 
(Sep. 3, 2015), http://www.progressive.org/news/2015/09/188286/police-fatalities-much-lower-
under-reagan-yet-walker-blames-obama 
30
 National Law Enforcement Officers Memorial Fund, http://www.nleomf.org/facts/officer-
fatalities-data 
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totaled fewer than 130, with some apparent discrepancy in the numbers reported 
by the Officer Down Memorial Page, reporting 129, and the National Law 
Enforcement Officers Memorial Fund, reporting 124.
3132
 Despite the 24 reported 
deaths caused by police shootings so far in 2016, neither organization currently 
reports any police officers having died as of January 15, 2016. The NLEOMF has 
also compiled statistics to provide a year by year comparison of the number of 
police officers killed, which does show a slight increase since 2013,  but also 
shows a dramatic decrease since the 1970s, which had a spike of 280 officers 
killed in 1974.
33
 While there is no record of those killed by police as 
comprehensive as that put together by the Washington Post for this time period, 
there is the admittedly incomplete record from the FBI, which indicates a general 
range of 300-450 people killed by police gunfire every year since 1976, rising and 
falling with peaks in 1976, 1993 and 2013.
34
 While police fatalities have 
decreased over 40 years, citizen fatalities by police have, in the best case, stayed 
consistent, and in the worst case, increased. 
 So, while it is clear that the job of a police officer is inherently dangerous, 
it is not as apparent that the profession is increasingly lethal. In fact, the amount 
of danger inherent in being a police officer has decreased so much that, according 
to Department of Labor statistics, the job of police officer is only the 18
th
 most 
                                                          
31
 Officer Down Memorial Page, https://www.odmp.org/search/year?year=2015 
32
 National Law Enforcement Officers Memorial Fund, http://www.nleomf.org/facts/recently-
fallen/recently-fallen-2015/?referrer=http://www.nleomf.org/facts/recently-fallen/ 
33
 National Law Enforcement Officers Memorial Fund, http://www.nleomf.org/facts/research-
bulletins/ 
34
 Wesley Lowery, There have been 500 people shot and killed by police in the U.S. so far in 2015 
(Jul. 10, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2015/07/10/there-have-
been-500-people-shot-and-killed-by-police-in-the-u-s-so-far-in-2015/. 
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dangerous job in the United States.
35
 It lags behind loggers, fishers, garbage 
collectors, taxi drivers, and bartenders. This Article does not seek to answer the 
question of why lethal police shootings have been on the rise, but the cause surely 
is not an increase in the amount of police fatalities.
36
 While there is a minor 
increase over the past few years, this is part of a heavy decline since 1976. In fact, 
some have considered this data with respect to the United States population over 
time in order to develop a metric to measure the safety of police officers.
37
 Under 
this analysis, despite the uptick in sheer numbers of police deaths from 2013 to 
2015, 2015 would be considered the second safest year for police officers in the 
entire history of the United States, with a rate of 0.112 gun-related deaths per one-
million people.
38
 Police are becoming safer while the citizenry is not. 
 
 
VI. POLICE INDICTMENTS, CONVICTIONS, & 
INCARCERATION 
 
 The rates at which grand juries vote to indict police officers is alarming 
when compared to rates of non-police officers who are indicted by grand jury. As 
mentioned above, in the 2009-2010 year, only 11 grand juries related to federal 
                                                          
35 Gwynn Guilford, Garbage collectors are more likely to die on the job than police patrol 
officers, (May 24, 2015), http://qz.com/410585/garbage-collectors-are-more-likely-to-die-on-the-
job-than-police-patrol-officers/ 
36
 Again, this Author would recommend Michelle Alexander’s The New Jim Crow to help provide, 
at least, a partial answer to this question as it pertains to a combination of policing done for profit, 
racial profiling in police work, harmful drug policies, and the militarization of the police. 
37
 Radley Balko, In the end, 2015 saw no ‘war on cops’ and no ‘national crime wave’, (Dec. 22, 
2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-watch/wp/2015/12/22/in-the-end-2015-saw-no-
war-on-cops-and-no-national-crime-wave/ 
38
 Radley Balko, In the end, 2015 saw no ‘war on cops’ and no ‘national crime wave’, (Dec. 22, 
2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-watch/wp/2015/12/22/in-the-end-2015-saw-no-
war-on-cops-and-no-national-crime-wave/ 
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prosecutions did not indict out of more than 150,000 potential prosecutions.
39
 
During the 7 year period of 2004-2011, the FBI investigated 2,718 incidents in 
which a police officer killed someone in the line of duty. Over this same 7 year 
period, only 41 police officers were charged with manslaughter or murder because 
of these incidents.
40
 The Cato Institute tracked allegations of police misconduct 
involving almost 11,000 police officers from April 2009 through December 2010. 
Of these, less than a third resulted in criminal charges, and of these charged, less 
than a third led to a conviction.
41
 While these raw pieces of data obviously cannot 
include significant information about the specific nature of any of these incidents, 
they demonstrate, but do not explain, a very simple truth: police officers are 
almost never charged with crimes. 
 What could be the reason for this? The grand jury process is almost 
certainly a part of it. As indicated earlier, the purpose of grand juries is to indict. 
Former New York State Chief Judge Sol Wachtler once remarked that a 
prosecutor could persuade a grand jury to “indict a ham sandwich.”42 Is this is the 
case, then, why can prosecutors not persuade grand juries to indict police officers? 
Perhaps, it is because of the unspoken corollary. If a prosecutor can convince a 
jury to indict a ham sandwich, why would a prosecutor not be able to convince a 
jury that the same ham sandwich committed no crime? A grand jury will decline 
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to indict if a prosecutor appears to desire that outcome, “thereby absolving the 
prosecutor from making a difficult political decision and leaving responsibility 
with the grand jury.”43 
 A look at the grand jury held in St. Louis County in relation to the killing 
of Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri may shed some light on the matter. 
Transcripts from this grand jury show that the prosecutors cross-examined its own 
potential witnesses, which is highly unusual, since grand juries are led by the 
prosecutor and for the purpose of finding support for prosecution.
44
 Darren 
Wilson, however, the would-be defendant, was not cross-examined and delivered 
four hours of testimony. During the process, the grand jury received inaccurate 
information suggesting that a police officer is allowed to shoot and kill a fleeing 
suspect, regardless whether or not that police officer feared the decedent. While 
this was corrected, it was weeks into the process. The transcripts were then 
released to the public, which is unusual when considering that grand jurors are 
sworn to secrecy. This is especially strange because in Missouri, it is a crime for a 
grand juror to release such information.  
 Another more recent example of strange behavior from a prosecutor 
during a grand jury comes from the process surrounding the lack of indictment of 
Timothy Loehmann and Frank Garmback in relation to the November 2014 
shooting of Tamir Rice. The shooting was caught on camera, and video is widely 
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available on the internet. In it, Rice can be seen in a park holding a pellet gun.
45
 
Some time later, he is seen sitting on a bench in the same park, as a police cruiser 
pulls up next to him, within the park. As the officers exit the car, Rice’s body can 
be seen falling, having been shot. 
 More than a year later, Cuyahoga County Prosecutor, Timothy McGinty, 
concluded the grand jury, and when it was over, there was no indictment. One 
might wonder how this can be, considering that Rice was twelve years old at the 
time, and because of how suddenly after arriving upon the scene, the police 
opened fire. Why was there no indictment of either Loehmann or Garmback here? 
Because McGinty recommended to the grand jury that they should not indict 
either police officer.
46
 In addition to his recommendation, McGinty and his office 
provided three separate reports declaring the shooting appropriate from experts, 
the type of which might be procured by a defense attorney in a criminal 
proceeding. In a press conference announcing the results of the grand jury, 
McGinty said “We don’t second guess police officers.”47 Essentially, McGinty 
wanted the grand jury to believe that Rice reached for the pellet gun, which the 
officers were to have reasonably mistaken for a real gun, and then opened fire. 
What this ignores, however, is that when the police were called on Rice, dispatch 
was told that the gun was likely not real, and that the police dispatch failed to 
provide this information to the officers who arrived on scene. This story also 
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ignores the notion of “Officer-Created Jeopardy,” which is a term describing 
events in which police officers act carelessly, thereby creating a dangerous 
situation, resulting in the use of force for protection.
48
 Operating on the 
assumption that Rice was brandishing a real gun and potentially dangerous, as 
police calls had indicated Rice had pointed it at passersby, the officers made a 
tactical error by choosing to approach Rice by bringing the cruiser within point 
blank shooting range of Rice. Doing so put the officers into a compromised 
position because, were the gun real, Rice would have been able to open fire 
almost immediately upon the officers, which in turn created the fear, that 
McGinty believed justified the shooting of Rice. McGinty could have done 
differently, and could have used this officer created jeopardy as a basis for 
criminality, arguing that because they were unreasonable in creating a dangerous 
situation without cause, they are not protected from guilt and punishment for the 
consequences of that initial reckless action.
49
 Whether or not this would have 
been a winning strategy in court, the choice not to employ it is telling, because it 
is the choice to allow police more power over civilians, rather than to attempt to 
diminish police power. 
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 McGinty described Rice’s death as “a perfect storm of human error,”50 and 
while this may very well be true, the same could not be said of the grand jury that 
he led. McGinty was under no obligation to carry out grand jury proceedings, and 
in fact, electing to do so only to recommend no charges undermines the very 
purpose. He could have, just as easily called a press conference and announced 
that no charges would be brought for the same reasons that he recommended as 
much to the jury. There is no human error here, but only human intention. Why he 
bothered with a grand jury rather than a press conference alone is unclear. But the 
results are palpable. Prosecutors have the power to decide who is and is not being 
hauled into court, and they want us to know that they do not second guess police 
officers. 
 Certainly, there are many reasons why a grand jury might not indict, or a 
prosecutor might not bring charges against, a police officer. The facts of the grand 
juries described above, while full of unusual behavior by the prosecutors’ offices, 
certainly explain why those grand jury did not indict. In so doing, the members of 
those jury behaved as would be expected from the statistics listed above. But what 
explains these statistics? 
 There are a litany of potential factors that might explain why charges are 
not brought against police officers. There is potential juror bias, jurors favoring 
the testimony of police officers about what kinds of behavior is justified; 
prosecutorial bias, prosecutorial bias, prosecutors, whether consciously or 
unconsciously, presenting a weaker case to a grand jury in order to protect the 
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working relationship between the police department and prosecutor’s office; and 
public pressure, bringing a case to a grand jury, rather than a preliminary hearing 
before a judge, as a means of responding to the public, and in so doing, presenting 
a case that may not be fully formed.
51
 These factors are not mutually exclusive, 
nor are they necessarily exhaustive, but they, collectively build to circumstances 
in which prosecutors can respond to public pressures in a way that releases them 
from potential backlash. Those who want a police officer charged are expected to 
be satisfied with a prosecutor’s attempt to bring charges. Those who want no 
charges brought are expected to be satisfied by the grand jury’s decision. Either 
way, the decision has the appearance of being taken out of the hands of the 
prosecutor. 
 In the instances when police are indicted, they are still convicted and 
incarcerated at considerably lower rates than those of the general population. 
According to data compiled by the Bureau of Justice, when police officers are 
indicted and formally charged with crimes, only 33% of those charges result in 
conviction, as opposed to the 66% conviction rate for the general population. In 
the cases when police officers are convicted, only 12% actually face 
incarceration, compared to the 48% rate of incarceration for convictions of 
members of the general public. 
5253
 Prosecutorial discretion clearly factors into the 
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lack of charges against police officers. How much it factors into conviction and 
sentencing is an open question, but one that need not be answered at this time. It 
is fruitless to delve into how to convict police officers when it is so difficult 
already to indict them.  
VII. WHY CIVIL LAWSUITS FAIL TO DELIVER JUSTICE 
 Prosecutors are just not doing enough to hold police officers accountable 
when suspects or civilians do not survive their police interactions. But our legal 
system allows people to seek justice in other ways, largely through financial 
compensation. In some instances, family survived by those killed by police 
officers do bring wrongful death cases against the department, city or state in 
question. Of course, as civil lawsuits, there is no risk of prison time for the 
accused police officer, and so the burden of proof is considerably lower than in a 
criminal proceeding.  But are they effective at halting police violence? 
 Rather than evaluate the specific awards or settlements given in these 
lawsuits, this Article will focus on some of the specifics surrounding the July 
2014 death of Eric Garner in Staten Island, New York City. Garner was 
questioned by police on accusations of illegally selling loose cigarettes and when 
he became agitated, several police officers detained him. This altercation has been 
caught on tape and is widely available to watch on the internet.
54
 In the video, one 
of the police officers, Daniel Pantaleo, clearly wraps his arm around Garner’s 
neck in order to bring him to the ground. When Garner is on the ground, he 
repeatedly says, “I can’t breathe,” until passing out. He was later pronounced 
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dead, ruled a homicide through compression of his neck.
55
 Daniel Pantaleo was 
then faced with a grand jury that declined to indict him for Garner’s death. 
Garner’s family filed a wrongful death lawsuit against New York City, which was 
released in a settlement for $5.9 million, which did not include any admission of 
fault in Garner’s death by Pantaleo, the NYPD, New York City, or New York 
State.
56
 
 This settlement has been criticized by police officers, including the head 
of the Sergeants Benevolent Association police union, calling it “obscene,” 
“shameful,” and an injustice for New York taxpayers, on the basis that a jury 
would have awarded significantly lower amount, if anything at all.
57
 Garner’s 
family, while accepting the settlement, made it clear that they did not believe 
justice had been served, with one of Garner’s children recounting that "Justice is 
when somebody is held accountable for what they do."
58
 
 These reactions get exactly to the core of why civil lawsuits after police 
violence is just not justice. While the criticism from the police could be fairly 
characterized as ignoring the significance of Garner’s death on a national scale, it 
raises a strong point in terms of who is picking up the bill. In these wrongful 
death suits, the city, or state, is the party with the ability to pay damages, not the 
individual police officer in question. Therefore, whether winning a lawsuit or 
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accepting a settlement, the only way a family can recover anything is at the 
taxpayers’ expense. This might be acceptable if the citizenry had direct control 
over policing practices and could proactively alter police practices immediately 
after being dealt such a financial blow, but that is not the case in New York City 
or anywhere. This raises the other point: in what sense is Daniel Pantaleo being 
held accountable for his actions? He has no obligation to make any payments to 
Garner’s family. While the Department of Justice has announced it would be 
investigating the case, there has been no public announcement on the progress of 
this investigation since it was begun in January 2015, and it is unclear, and in this 
Author’s opinion, unlikely, that charges will be brought.59 The worst case 
scenario for Pantaleo could be a loss of his job, which is in no way commensurate 
with Garner’s loss of his life60 
 The further question has yet to be addressed: do these kinds of lawsuits 
cause police officers to behave any differently? Is the violence tempered? This 
settlement was announced in July of 2015. From August 1 to December 31 of 
2015, there were 418 people shot and killed by police across the United States.
61
 
Five of these people were killed in New York State. During all of 2015, 18 people 
were killed by police in New York State. Whether or not the public attention of 
Garner’s death and settlement for Garner’s family is responsible for these 
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numbers in New York is unclear. Across the nation, however, it is apparent that 
there has been no clear decrease in police related fatalities. Regardless, however, 
even if such a decrease could be shown, would that be an acceptable public policy 
to forward? Should we live in a country in which the acceptable way to prevent 
police violence is to wait until a case becomes egregious enough to justify 7 
figure settlements in every state and then to let the effect of such financial losses 
lead to a decrease in violence? How many will die in the meantime?  
VIII. THE NEED FOR INDEPENDENT INVESTIGATION 
AND PROSECUTION 
 
 The sheer number of incidents in which police officers kill citizens in the 
line of duty suggests a problem, in and of itself. When looked at in relation to the 
number of incidents in which police officers are killed and the rate at which police 
officers are indicted, convicted and incarcerated, it is nothing short of an 
epidemic, that shows prosecutors are failing to hold police officers accountable. 
The only alternative is to presume that in the vast majority of cases, police 
officers are entirely justified in the use of lethal force, even fewer than 130 police 
officers have died in the line of duty during 2015, almost 8 times as many were so 
fearful for their lives to justify lethal force. It requires believing that in at least 93 
instances, police were so justified when faced with an unarmed person.
62
 
 Typically, proposals to help control the abuses of justice that can result 
from prosecutorial discretion focus on plea bargaining and discriminatory 
charging. Interesting, and potentially useful, proposals have included judicial 
review of charging decisions, to as to have an early chance to challenge charges 
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as discriminatory, as well as creating standards for plea bargaining to create more 
consistent and, downright, fair results from these bargaining agreements.
63
 While 
these proposals would support the rights afforded to the accused, they would do 
nothing to affect those who, for whatever reason, avoid even the accusation. In 
fact, similar proposals to require prosecution in certain instances would prove 
unworkable, as explained above. 
 The only viable solutions to the problems of police violence is to actually 
punish police officers for their bad behavior. But, because prosecutors have 
demonstrated an unwillingness to prosecute police officers, the only realistic 
solutions would have to include removing such decisions from the hands of 
prosecutors. Some might criticize this viewpoint as extreme, claiming that the 
number of police officers facing charges in 2015 is a significant increase over the 
previous rates. However, this argument is a clear failure. While it is true that the 
rates of charges being brought has increased, and has even increased by a 3, from 
about 5 per year up to 15, as of November 2015, this is simply not enough to 
deliver justice.
64
 Even with the threefold increase, the raw numbers are simply not 
enough. There are others who have engaged in tracking police related deaths 
using different criteria than that of the Washington Post, and have reported 
numbers upwards of 1,200.
65
 By any metric used to track these death, this 
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amounts to less than 2% of police related fatalities having charges brought against 
officers. Further, these 15 instances do not all correspond to incidences which 
occurred during 2015. As referenced above, many grand jury proceedings do not 
begin until months, and sometimes years after the potential crime has been 
committed. Of 2015 incidents, only 7 cases led to charges.
66
 Even if we, as a 
society, are to grant that police officers are best equipped to assess dangerous 
situations and to decide when force is appropriate, would we also have to accept 
that when police officers are responsible for, potentially, 1,000 deaths, that we 
should not second guess them more than 98% percent of the time? 
 Further, were the argument to have teeth that the current increase in 
charges is sufficient, the cause of this increase must be evaluated. In a vacuum, 
one might assume that a threefold increase in charges would correspond to a 
threefold increase of incidences of police related killings. This is simply not true, 
however. While the Washington Post has only begun to compile data beginning in 
2015, other sources have been doing so for further back. One source, Killed By 
Police, suggests that in 2014, 1,111 people were killed by police and in 2013, 771 
were killed.
67
 As noted above, the FBI does compile data that is entirely 
voluntarily reported by police departments, and leads to numbers in the range of 
300-450 per year. Of course, all of this is regardless of the fact that only 7 of the 
15 officers charged in 2015 were in relation to events that occurred within 2015. 
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Even if a threefold increase in rates of police related killings were found to exist, 
which available data does not support, the adjusted rate of charges brought for 
2015 would not reflect that increase. 
 What else, then, might be the reason for the above average rate of 
charges? One possibility may be footage. While the Cook County Attorney 
absolutely rejected that charges for the killer of Laquan McDonald, in Chicago, 
had anything to do with the, at the time, forthcoming release of footage of the 
shooting, it is worth considering that because of the combination of pushes for 
police body cameras, the use of dash board cameras, citizens equipped 
smartphones, and security cameras, more and more incidents of police violence 
are being caught on tape.
68
 Some would suggest that the availability of this type 
of footage is the only thing at all influencing the decisions to prosecute.
 69
 It is 
difficult to say how great of an affect this is having on prosecutors, due to the 
likely political ramifications of saying that public availability of these videos is 
what is leading to charges, rather than the duty to seek justice. But, to suggest that 
video has had no effect whatsoever strikes this Author as disingenuous. 
 Another possibility for this increase might have to do with the increased 
levels of unrest resulting out of police related deaths. Since Michael Brown’s 
death in Ferguson, Missouri, in 2014, there have been demonstrations across the 
country, largely led by the Black Lives Matter movement, demanding justice for 
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those killed by police. Characterized both as protests and as riots, these 
demonstrations have been met with both significant media attention and 
considerable police action. While, just as with footage, it is unlikely that a 
prosecutor would admit that charges have been brought against a police officer 
because of protest, rather than for the pursuit of justice, it is clear that some 
sections of public discourse have adjusted and will no longer be silent in response 
to police violence. Again, to discount the effect of these demonstrations on the 
behavior of prosecutors appears disingenuous.  
 But, while public pressure could certainly justify why a prosecutor 
chooses to focus on murders rather than petty thefts, such public pressure is 
inexcusable as the sole reason for prosecuting a police officer. The duty to seek 
justice must include holding accountable police officers whose actions have 
unnecessary lethal consequences, regardless of if there is a protest at the site of 
the shooting or if there is publicly available footage of unjustifiable behavior. 
Fortunately, there is another system that can be implemented.  
 Rather than leave these decisions in the hands of regular prosecutors, who 
have failed to act to solve the problem of police violence, someone else must be 
given the task. In order to do this, there must be independent review, from state 
agencies, that are not dependent upon police cooperation for the regular course of 
their work, and who would not be subject to reelection due to dissatisfaction from 
the public. There is one federal bill, currently under review by the House 
Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, Homeland Security and Investigations that 
could help to solve this problem: the Police Training and Independent Review Act 
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of 2015. The bill would require that any state in receipt of federal funding to assist 
in law enforcement to institute both specialized training related to cultural 
diversity, racial biases and how to safely interact with the mentally ill or else risk 
loss of up to 20% of such funding. But more importantly, it would require such 
states to have active laws that would support independent prosecution of members 
of law enforcement or risk lose up to 20% of such funding.
70
 While this bill would 
form a good start, it does not go far enough, as it fails to specify the nature and 
extent of authority that such independent prosecution would have. While, if 
passed into law, it is a near certainty that most states would enact appropriate 
legislation as to comply, there is little within the text of the bill to indicate how 
effective those pieces of legislation would be. A better proposal could be built 
upon the bare bones of the Police Training and Independent Review Act, one that 
would elaborate on the type of legislation that would adequately satisfy the 
provisions of the Act.
71
 
 What is truly needed is a series of Special Prosecutor’s Offices at the 
individual state levels, or else a functional equivalent. Such offices must have the 
authority to bring charges and prosecute those charges in an effective manner. In 
order to do so, these offices must be sufficiently funded to employ personnel and 
obtain other resources as necessary to fully investigate charges. While the current 
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financial incentives of the Act are likely to guarantee compliance, the Act could, 
and should, be further amended to provide additional funding for these agencies.
72
 
 Neither aspect, independent investigation nor independent prosecution, on 
its own would be enough. Both must work in tandem to remove the possibility of 
ineffective investigation due to reliance on the police to police themselves or 
ineffective prosecution caused by the necessary working relationships between 
police officers and prosecutors. 
 If one is unmoved by the data detailed above and believes that current 
prosecutors are beginning to take action on their own, because of the increase in 
charges in 2015, this Author has only the following to say: People are dying while 
we wait for prosecutors to figure things out for themselves. Perhaps prosecutors 
will come to a consensus and work actively to combat the problem of police 
violence. But perhaps they will not. Perhaps they will conclude that we should not 
second guess police officers. The only solution is to force them to do so. 
IX. CONCLUSIONS 
 Police officers are a necessary aspect of society. Because of the access to 
firearms in the United States, it is necessary for police officers to be equipped 
with firearms of their own, for the instances when they are faced with lethal force, 
so that they may use lethal force to protect themselves or to protect the lives of 
others. But, the manner in which America’s police are using this force is 
unacceptable. The rates of police killing citizens is nearly 8 times higher than the 
rates of police dying in the line of duty. 
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 Nonetheless, they have been afforded protections by the only agents of 
government with the authority to hold them accountable. Prosecutors 
continuously fail to bring charges against police officers because of political 
pressures and maintenance of a work relationship. As a result, the police are 
unrestrained and our citizens are unprotected. These results confound on one 
another, as a lack of police officers being charged reinforces the idea that police 
are more likely than not justified in the lethal use of force. The fewer charges are 
brought, the more political pressure there is for prosecutors to not bring charges. 
This system is unworkable and inhumane. 
 Prosecutors have broad discretion, and they need this discretion to do their 
jobs. But prosecutors also play to win. They do not call grand juries unless they 
expect indictment or unless they want to relieve pressure placed upon them. They 
do not try cases they expect to lose. And they do not bring charges with political 
costs. Prosecutors play to win, but their discretion lets them make the rules, and 
these rules favor police officers who kill rather than those killed by the police. 
 This power must be taken away from prosecutors, and put in the hands of 
people with nothing to lose from disgruntling police departments. Police officers 
are meant to be the guardians of our society, and prosecutors the ones responsible 
for guarding us from them. They have failed to do so, and so, we now need 
watchmen willing, and able, to do the job. 
